SECURITIES-TENDER OFFERS-A HARD LOOK AT SOFT INFORMATION: DISCLOSURE OF ASSET APPRAISALS, CORPORATE PROJECTIONS, AND OTHER FORWARD-LOOKING
INFORMATION
REQUIRED IF MATERIAL AND IF DISCLOSURE WOULD BE MORE
BENEFICIAL THAN DETRIMENTAL TO TARGET SHAREHOLDERS
-

Flynn v. Bass Brothers, 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984).

There are three courses of action available to a shareholder
of a target company faced with a tender offer.1 The shareholder
may retain the shares, tender them to the tender offeror, or publicly dispose of them in the securities markets.2 Congress has
recognized that in order to choose one of these alternatives
properly, shareholders must have enough information to make
an informed investment decision. Accordingly, the Williams
Act 4 was enacted in 1968 to protect investors confronted by
tender offers for their stock.5 At the time the Act was passed,
I Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 283 (7th Cir. 1981).
2 Id.; cf. Jorden & Woodward, An Appraisal of Disclosure Requirements in Contests for
Control Under the Williams Act, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 817, 826 (1978) (shareholder
options are: to tender shares immediately and hope offeror will purchase all tendered shares, to wait for more advantageous and lucrative offer and, if none
manifests, to tender late and thereby incur risk that shares will not be purchased, or
to sell shares through market transactions).
3 See 113 CONG. REC. 854, 855 (1967). Prior to the passage of the Williams Act,
Senator Williams stated:
It can be argued that a cash tender offer is a straightforward business proposition which can be rejected by a stockholder or accepted by
him, usually at a price in excess of the market price. But where no information is known about the persons seeking control, or their plans, the
shareholder is forced to evaluate the proposition on the basis of a market price which reflects the evaluation of the company based on the assumption that the present management and their policies will continue.
The persons seeking control, however, may have other plans, for example, to liquidate the company to realize an amount per share far in excess of the market value. By keeping his plans secret, the offeror is able
to deprive the shareholders of their rightful participation in the liquidation. After all, the liquidation plans may be the reason for the tender
offer. All shareholders should have such information so that they can
make informed investment decisions on the basis of the same facts
known by the person making the tender.
Id. at 855.
4 Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 781(i), 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)). For a discussion of the Williams Act, see
infra note 68.
5 See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 22-27 (1977). The Williams Act,
however, does not define "tender offer." Therefore, it is disputed whether the Act
applies at all. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Int'l Co., 498 F. Supp. 1231, 1239 (N.D. Ill.
1980) (meaning of tender offer within Williams Act develops on case-by-case basis
because neither Congress nor SEC has defined it). In a case involving alleged ma-

511

512

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16:511

Congress believed that the disclosed information should include
the identity of the offeror, the source and size of the funds, the
purpose of the tender offer, and the tender offeror's plans for the
target company. 6 Notwithstanding this recognized right to make
an informed investment decision, Federal courts, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and various commentators
discouraged the disclosure of hypothetical data such as asset appraisals and future8 projections.7 They did not look upon such
"soft information" as an integral part of an informed investment
decision.9 Indeed, because of the inherent unreliability of such
information, they determined that the disclosure of asset appraisals and future projections was detrimental to tender offer target
shareholders.

0

Recently, however, the Third Circuit in Flynn v. Bass Broth1
ers reversed this long-standing aversion to soft information.
The court recognized that shareholders faced with a tender offer
may require access to asset appraisals and future projections in
order to make an informed decision.' 2 Moreover, the Flynn court
believed that the value of disclosing such information could outweigh the disadvantages traditionally associated with revealing
3
soft information.

1

The plaintiffs in Flynn, minority shareholders of National Alfalfa Dehydrating and Milling Company (National Alfalfa), were
terial omissions and misrepresentations in a tender offer, the SEC submitted an
amicus curiae brief that enumerated eight factors that courts have generally utilized
to determine whether an acquisition constitutes a tender offer under the Williams
Act:
(1) "active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders.
(2) solicitation is "for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock."
(3) offer to purchase is "at a premium..."
(4) terms of offer "firm rather than negotiable."
(5) offer "contingent on the tender of a fixed minimum number of
shares .. "
(6) offer is "open for only a limited period of time."
(7) offerees "subjected to pressure to sell their stock."
(8) "public announcements of a purchasing program . . .precede or
accompany a rapid accumulation .. "
Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 791 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
6 See supra note 3.
7 See infra notes 66-71.

8 For a discussion of "soft information," see infra note 67.
9 See infra notes 66-71.
10 Id.
I1 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984).
12 See id. at 988.
13 See id.
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faced with a tender offer in March of 1976.' 4 This tender offer by
Bass Brothers Enterprises, Inc. (Bass Brothers) was the culmination of a series of events precipitated by Prochemco, Inc.
(Prochemco). "

In 1975, the president of Prochemco contacted Bass Brothers to obtain financing for the former's proposed purchase of a
controlling block of National Alfalfa stock. 16 The then-current
owner of this block was Charles Peterson, the former president of
National Alfalfa. 17 In its presentation of the financing proposal to
Bass Brothers, Prochemco utilized two reports it had prepared
concerning the history and operations of National Alfalfa.'"
These reports contained appraisals of National Alfalfa's assets
"based on alternative hypothetical valuations.' 9 The first document described the proposed stock purchase and contained analyses of the history, operations, and assets of National Alfalfa. 2"
14 Id. at 981-82. At the time of the tender offer, National Alfalfa was "a Delaware corporation whose stock was traded on the American Stock Exchange." Id. at
981. It "was engaged in farming, farm supply operations and the sale of animal
feed." Id.
15 See id. At the time of the tender offer, Bass Brothers was a closely-held corporation of Texas. Id. "[I]ts principal business was oil exploration with subsidiary
interests in hydrocarbon production, radio, television, ranching and cattle raising."
Id. Prochemco, at the time of the tender offer, was also a Texas corporation whose
business consisted of ranching and cattle feeding. Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. The following events led to Peterson's decision to sell his controlling interest in National Alfalfa:
In 1969 or 1970, Peterson had acquired approximately 52%o of National
Alfalfa's stock and had become president and chief executive officer of
National Alfalfa in exchange for the transfer of land that he owned in
Nebraska and other assets to National Alfalfa. However, some of Peterson's assets were encumbered and National Alfalfa only wanted to accept them debt free. Consequently, Peterson borrowed $4,450,000 to
remove the encumbrances and pledged 1,100,000 shares of National Alfalfa stock as collateral for the loan.
While Peterson was president and chief executive officer of National Alfalfa, he entered into speculative commodities transactions on
behalf of National Alfalfa, in which National Alfalfa lost approximately
$2 million. In addition, Peterson entered National Alfalfa into the cattle
feeding business, from which National Alfalfa lost approximately
$6,677,396. Peterson was removed as president and chief executive officer in February, 1974, and subsequently, was sued by National Alfalfa.
Brief for Appellants at 5-6, Flynn v. Bass Bros., 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984) (citations omitted); see also Flynn, 744 F.2d at 990 n.21 (National Alfalfa sued Peterson
for $2.1 million).
18 Flynn, 744 F.2d at 981.

19 Id.
20 Flynn v. Bass Bros., 456 F. Supp. 484, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1978), af'd, 744 F.2d 978
(3d Cir. 1984).
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The asset analysis prepared by Prochemco consisted of a threetiered valuation reflecting per share overall values of National Alfalfa. 2 1 This valuation report stated that "$6.40 could be realized
through 'liquidation under stress conditions[,]' $12.04 could be
realized through 'liquidation in an orderly fashion over a reasonable period of time'[, and] $16.40 represented National Alfalfa's
value 'as [an] ongoing venture.' "22 In addition, the second report included a valuation chart of National Alfalfa's assets that
was prepared by Prochemco. 2 3 It gave two figures: "Value per
Peterson," or $17.28 per share, and "Value per Prochemco," or
$7.60 per share.2 4
Although Bass Brothers declined to finance Prochemco's
contemplated purchase, it informed them that it would consider
making the National Alfalfa purchase itself should Prochemco fail
to procure funding. 25 In late 1975, when Prochemco still had not
obtained the necessary financing, Bass Brothers paid Prochemco
a finder's fee of $130,000 and acquired the two reports.2 6 Shortly
thereafter, Bass Brothers entered into and exercised an option to
purchase 52% of the outstanding common stock of National Alfalfa owned by Peterson at a price of $6.47 per share.2 7 It then
acquired in a private sale an additional 9.1% of National Alfalfa
stock for $6.45 per share. 2' This private sale brought Bass Brothers' holdings to 61.2% of National Alfalfa's outstanding stock.2 9
On March 2, 1976, a public announcement was made by
Bass Brothers of its tender offer of $6.45 per share for all shares
of National Alfalfa outstanding.3 0 Bass Brothers failed to include
the two Prochemco reports that contained the various asset appraisal values in the tender offer materials. 3 Bass Brothers did
include financial data, however, which suggested that National
21 Id.
22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id. The district court stated that "[tiwo explanatory footnotes revealed the
source of part, but not all, of the discrepancy in the two valuations; Peterson and
Prochemco used sharply disparate prices in determining the value of National Alfalfa's land holdings, which accounted for more than half the total value of all National Alfalfa assets." Id.
25 Flynn, 744 F.2d at 981.
26 Id.
27 Id.

28 Id. at 981-82.
29 Id. at 982.
30 Id.
31 Id.
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Alfalfa's stock value was lower than $6.45 per share. 2 Furthermore, "the tender offer stated in bold letters that [Bass Brothers]
did not receive any material non-public information from [National Alfalfa] with respect to its prior acquisitions of shares nor
. . . does it believe it presently possesses any such information." 3 3 Bass Brothers also stated that it was unable to verify independently the information furnished by National Alfalfa and
thus disclaimed any responsibility for the accuracy of this
information.3 4
The tender offer also referred to and attached as Appendix E
a letter dated February 27, 1976 from National Alfalfa's president to Bass Brothers. 5 The letter stated that "National Alfalfa's
land had appreciated significantly and that, as a result, 'stockholders could receive, upon a liquidation of the Company, an
amount per Share significantly higher than the current book
value . . . and possibly higher than the . . . $6.45 per Share offered by [Bass Brothers].' "36 Regarding this letter, the tender
offer stated that Bass Brothers had not made an independent appraisal of the land's value
and thus was not making any represen37
tations concerning it.
On March 11, 1976, National Alfalfa's chairman advised all
the shareholders in writing that the inclusion by Bass Brothers in
its tender offer of this letter was unauthorized. 38 The chairman's
letter reiterated the facts set out in the February 27th correspondence; however, it disavowed any inferences Bass Brothers may
have drawn from these facts. 9 In addition, the chairman denied
any implication in the tender offer that the board had approved
of the terms therein.4 °
In response to the chairman's letter, Bass Brothers supplemented the tender offer on March 15, 1976. 4 l Although the supplement advised the stockholders to ignore Appendix E, it
repeated the possibility that National Alfalfa's land holdings
32 Flynn v. Bass Bros., 456 F. Supp. 484, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd, 744 F.2d 978
(3d Cir. 1984).
33 Flynn, 744 F.2d at 982 (citation omitted).
34 Id.
35 Flynn v. Bass Bros., 456 F. Supp. 484, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd, 744 F.2d 978
(3d Cir. 1984).
36 Id. at 488 (citation omitted).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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would appreciate to a value greater than their book value.42 In
addition, the supplement extended the offer for another week to
allow shareholders time to consider the new information. 43 Following the issuance of this supplement, the plaintiffs tendered
their shares to Bass Brothers and received $6.45 per share.4 4
Upon the expiration of the tender offer, Bass Brothers had
acquired in excess of 92% of National Alfalfa's outstanding stock
and thereupon replaced the board of directors. 45 Bass Brothers
then completed a short-form merger 46 under Delaware law of
"National Alfalfa and Bass Brothers Farming Company, a whollyowned subsidiary of Bass Brothers. '47 National Alfalfa was the
surviving entity and became Bass Brothers' wholly-owned
subsidiary.48
Subsequently, in a class action, a group of former National
Alfalfa minority shareholders sought damages in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.49
They claimed that the tender offer's information was inadequate
pursuant to state and Federal securities laws. 50 The plaintiffs alId. The supplement stated in part:
Depending upon the respective market values for such land, stockholders could receive, upon liquidation of the Company, an amount per
share significantly higher than the current book value and possibly
higher than the price of $6.45 per Share offered by Offeror in the Offer.
The amount received by stockholders upon liquidation of the Company
would also be dependent upon, among other things, the market value of
the Company's other assets and the length of time allowed for such
liquidation.
Flynn, 744 F.2d at 982.
43 Flynn, 744 F.2d at 982.
44 Flynn v. Bass Bros., 456 F. Supp. 484, 488 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 744 F.2d 978
(3d Cir. 1984).
45 Flynn, 744 F.2d at 982.
46 A short-form merger is described as follows:
A number of states provide special rules for the merger of a subsidiary corporation into its parent where the parent owns substantially all of
the shares of the subsidiary. This is known as a short-form merger.
Short-form mergers under such special statutes may generally be effected by: (a) adoption of a resolution of merger by the parent corporation, (b) mailing a copy of the plan of merger to all shareholders of
record of the subsidiary, and (c) filing the executed articles of merger
with the secretary of state and his issuance of a certificate of merger.
This type of merger is less expensive and time consuming than the normal type merger.
B AcK's LAw DICTIONARY 892 (5th ed. 1979).
47 Flynn, 744 F.2d at 982.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
42
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leged violations 5 ' of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, specifically sections 10(b)5 2 and 14(e), 53 and the SEC's rule lOb-5 5 4 for
failure to disclose the following information: "the Prochemco reports; a report allegedly commissioned by Bass Brothers to corroborate the appraisals in the Prochemco reports; and an internal
valuation prepared by National Alfalfa's accountant and vice
president, Carl Schweitzer." 55 The plaintiffs also claimed that
Bass Brothers' representations in the tender offer that it did not
have any independent appraisals 56 and that it was unable to verify
independently the correctness of National
Alfalfa's land values
57
misrepresentations.
material
constituted
At the close of the plaintiffs' case, Bass Brothers requested a
directed verdict.5" The district judge granted the directed verdict, reasoning that the evidence presented by the plaintiffs was
insufficient under state or Federal law to permit the case to be
sent to the jury.59 On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion. 61 Central to the court's holding was the concept of materiality. 6 ' According to the court, the issue was

"whether the alleged nondisclosures were material omissions,
and thus breached the duty to disclose."' 6 2 To this end, the Flynn
court explicitly adopted the standard of materiality established by
the Supreme Court 6 3 in the case of TSC Industries v. Northway,
51 Id. at 981.
52

15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).

53 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).

54 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
55 Flynn, 744 F.2d at 988.
56 Brief for Appellants, supra note 17, at 30.
57 Id. at 35. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged two Delaware state law violations.
Flynn v. Bass Bros., 456 F. Supp. 484, 493-94 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 744 F.2d 978
(3d Cir. 1984). First, they claimed that Bass Brothers violated the fiduciary duty
imposed on majority shareholders under Delaware law to disclose all valuations of
stock when such majority shareholders are also the tender offerors. Id. at 493. Second, the plaintiffs claimed that Bass Brothers also violated its majority shareholder
fiduciary duty "when it merged National Alfalfa with Bass Brothers Farming Company, allegedly for the sole purpose of 'forcing out' all public ownership of National Alfalfa." Id. at 494. Thus, the plaintiffs claimed that Bass Brothers effected
the short-form merger without a valid corporate purpose. Id.
58 Flynn, 744 F.2d at 983.
59 Id. The district court "concluded that 'the information . . . provided by the
tender offeror was not materially misleading . . . [because] the information that
was contained in the Prochemco report is the kind that is not permitted to be disclosed to shareholders because it is not based on sufficient information.' " Id.
60 Id. at 991.

61 See id. at 984-85.
62 Id.

at 984.

63 Id. at 985.
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Under that standard, "[a]n omitted fact is material if there
would
is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
65
consider it important in deciding how to vote."
Inc. 64

426 U.S. 438 (1976).
Flynn, 744 F.2d at 985 (quoting TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 449). Materiality
did not always have this meaning in the context of securities filings and disclosures.
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), The New York Times
and the Herald Tribune carried stories on a rumored mineral strike by Texas Gulf
Sulphur (TGS) in eastern Canada. Id. at 844-45. In response, TGS issued a press
release denying the factual basis of the rumors and stating that further drilling was
required to make any definite statement on the grade and size of ore, lest such a
statement be otherwise premature and misleading. Id. at 845. Several days later,
TGS released a second statement revealing in some detail the actual magnitude of
the discovery. Id. at 846-47. Afterward, the SEC brought an action against the
company, alleging that the first release contained material misrepresentations and
omissions in violation of rule lOb-5. Id. at 839.
Rule lOb-5, promulgated pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
The Second Circuit stated that the basic test of materiality "was whether a reasonable man would attach importance [to the information] . . .in determining his
choice of action in the transaction in question." Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 849
(citations omitted). The court observed that this materiality standard includes any
fact that "might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities." Id. The
Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court to decide whether the failure
to detail the extent of the mineral discovery was material to a reasonable shareholder and thus made the first press release misleading. See id. at 864.
In 1976, Justice Marshall limited the materiality test formulated in Texas Gulf
Sulphur. See TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 445-49. In TSC Industries, National Industries, Inc. acquired 34% of TSC Industries' (TSC) voting stock and later appointed
five nominees to the board of directors. Id. at 440. In addition, National Industries' president and chief executive officer and its executive vice president became
chairman of TSC's board of directors and chairman of TSC's executive committee,
respectively. Id. Subsequently, TSC's new board of directors approved the liquidation and sale of all of TSC's assets to National Industries. Id. at 440-41. TSC and
National Industries then solicited shareholder approval of the proposed liquidation
and sale by issuing a joint proxy statement. Id. at 441. Ultimately, the proxy statement proved successful, and TSC was liquidated and dissolved. Id. Northway, Inc.,
as a TSC shareholder, brought an action against TSC and National Industries, alleging that the proxy statement was materially misleading and therefore violative of
§ 14(a) and rules 14a-3 and 14a-9 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. Specifically, Northway alleged that TSC and National Industries omitted from the
64

65
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When faced with the question of whether a misrepresentation or omission was material and therefore violative of the antifraud provisions contained in the securities laws, Federal courts
have applied the TSC Industries standard when the information at
issue was by nature objectively verifiable, definite, and sufficiently
based in fact. 66 When, however, the allegedly material misrepresentations or omissions have involved asset appraisals, future
projections, and other hypothetical data-the so-called soft information 67 -courts have focused on the nature of the information
proxy statement material facts relating to the degree of National Industries' control
over TSC. Id. at 441-42.
On the issue of materiality, the Supreme Court rejected the test applied by the
Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur. See id. at 445. Such a formulation, the Court
maintained, established "too low a threshold" for liability. Id. Instead, the Court
concluded that "[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." Id. at
449 (emphasis added). Based on this more stringent standard, the Supreme Court
held that the omissions in the proxy statement were not materially misleading. Id.
at 463.
66 See, e.g., Pavlidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227,
1231 (1st Cir. 1984) (proxy statement drafted by insiders acting in their own interest does not change standard of materiality established in TSC Industries); Staffin v.
Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1205 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting Third Circuit expressly
adopted TSC Industries definition of materiality for rule lOb-5 actions and would
now adopt same standard for action based on § 14(e)); Resource Exploration v.
Yankee Oil & Gas, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 54, 62 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (TSC Industries standard utilized for alleged Williams Act violations); Radol v. Thomas, 556 F. Supp.
586, 593 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (TSC Industries standard utilized for alleged violation of
§ 14(e)).
67 There is no generally accepted definition of soft information. See Schneider,
Nits, Grits and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 254, 255 (1972).
Nevertheless, it has generally been characterized as all information that does not
fall within the ambit of its antithesis-hard information-or by reference to "several non-exclusive and non-exhaustive categories." Id. Hard information means
"statements concerning objectively verifiable historical events or situations-commonly called 'facts' in SEC parlance-as distinguished from opinions, predictions,
or subjective evaluations." Id. at 254-55. According to the categorical approach,
soft information is any of the following:
(1) forward-looking statements concerning the future, such as projections, forecasts, predictions, and statements concerning plans and expectations; (2) statements concerning past or present situations when
the maker of the statement lacks the data necessary to prove its accuracy-for example, information on a company's historical share of the
market, when it does not have access to precise statistics concerning its
competitors; (3) information based primarily on subjective evaluations-for example, representations concerning the competence or integrity of management, the relative efficiency of a manufacturing
operation, or the appraised value of assets; (4) statements of motive,
purpose, or intention, since it is frequently easier to verify objectively
what was done than to determine why it was done-for example, explanation of the reasons for which an auditor has been discharged; (5)
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itself, rather than on the reasonable shareholder's perception of
it. 6 8 Because soft information is not objectively verifiable, defistatements involving qualifying words, such as "excellent," "ingenious," "efficient" and "imaginative," for which there are no generally
accepted objective standards of measurement in most contexts.
Id. at 255 (footnotes omitted).
68 See, e.g., Pavlidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227,
1236 (1st Cir. 1984) (asset appraisals properly excluded from proxy statement because inherently speculative and misleading); South Coast Servs. Corp. v. Santa
Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting both courts
and SEC "have consistently discouraged the inclusion of appraised asset valuations
in proxy materials"); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.
1981) (no duty upon management or directors to disclose financial projections);
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1292 (2d Cir. 1973) (note to rule
14a-9 mandating adequate disclosure in proxy statements gives as example of misleading information "[p]redictions as to specific future market values, earnings or
dividends").
The legislative history of the Williams Act gives no indication that any standard
other than shareholders' perceptions of the significance of particular information
determine the disclosure requirement in tender offers. See 113 CONG. REC. 854-56
(1967). In an effort to control "pirate" corporate takeover tactics and to regulate
tender offers generally, Congress passed the Williams Act in 1968. See Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1977); Jorden & Woodward, supra note 2, at
825-26. The purpose of the Act was to ensure that shareholders confronted with a
tender offer would have sufficient information regarding the intentions and qualifications of the offering party in order to respond to the offer. Piper, 430 U.S. at 35;
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975); Resource Exploration v.
Yankee Oil & Gas, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 54, 62 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
The capstone of the Williams Act is § 14(e), the broad antifraud provision directed at the conduct of tender offerors seeking to influence target shareholders or
the outcome of the tender offer. Piper, 430 U.S. at 24; Resource Exploration, 566 F.
Supp. at 62. Section 14(e) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of
security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request,
or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
Thus, § 14(e) prohibits material misrepresentations and the omission of material facts in tender offers. Id. To the proponents of the Williams Act, tender offerors had to disclose their identities, financing, plans, and purposes for making the
offers because shareholders supposedly needed this information to make an informed decision on the disposition of their shares. 113 CONG. REC. 854, 855
(1967). As in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), and TSC
Industries, shareholder perceptions of materiality largely determined what information the proponents of the Williams Act considered critical to an informed decision.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing "materiality").
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nite, and factually based, courts have determined that it does not
have to be disclosed. 69 Instead, courts have reasoned that if such
soft information were disclosed, even a reasonable shareholder
might attach importance to what was inherently unreliable information. 70 Thus, where the information at issue was deemed soft,
any misrepresentation or omission thereof generally did not constitute a material misrepresentation
or omission in violation of
7
the securities laws. '

69 See cases cited supra note 68. At least one court has applied both the SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), and TSC Industries, standards
of materiality concurrently and still held that soft information, such as asset appraisals and future projections, did not have to be disclosed because it was unreliable by nature and therefore detrimental to shareholders. Resource Exploration v.
Yankee Oil & Gas, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ohio 1983); see supra note 65 and
accompanying text (discussing materiality standards). For a factual and legal summary of Resource Exploration, see infra text accompanying notes 108-120. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio stated that disclosures pursuant to the Williams Act were only required if related to material information.
Resource Exploration, 566 F. Supp. at 62. The court defined materiality by both the
TSC Industries and the Texas Gulf Sulphur standards. Id. at 62-63. Ultimately, however, the case turned on the nature of the information that the plaintiff claimed
should have been disclosed in a tender offer. See id. at 63. Shareholder perceptions
of materiality-whether in a TSC Industries or Texas Gulf Sulphur bent-were not dispositive of the question of disclosure of particular soft information. See id.
70 E.g., South Coast Servs. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d
1265, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 129294 (2d Cir. 1973); Resource Exploration v. Yankee Oil & Gas, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 54,
63 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
71 See cases cited supra note 68. The Second Circuit noted that "[it has long
been an article of faith among lawyers specializing in the securities field that appraisals of assets could not be included in a proxy statement." Gerstle v. GambleSkogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1293 (2d Cir. 1973). While there has been no legal
bar per se to the disclosure of soft information in proxy statements, tender offers,
and other SEC filings, the inclusion of future earnings, appraised asset valuations,
and other hypothetical data has been firmly discouraged. See Kripke, Rule 1Ob-5
Liability and "Material" "Facts", 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061, 1070-71 (1971) (arguing
courts have discouraged disclosure of soft information partly due to SEC habit of
favoring pessimistic approach to registration statements); see also Hewitt, Developing
Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAw. 887, 955 (1977) (stating "[t]he
Commission's position historically was that projections and forecasts were improper in registration statements and other SEC filings unless they were forecasts
of negative trends").
Courts have, nevertheless, noted that the presence of some indicia of reliability
may favor the disclosure of what would otherwise be soft information. See, e.g.,
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 292 (7th Cir. 1981) (though "no duty
upon management or directors to disclose financial projections, . . . company
[that] undertakes partial disclosure of such information [has] duty to make. . . full
disclosure of known facts necessary to avoid making such statements misleading");
James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 587 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1978) (projections, sales
figures, forecasts, and other soft information rise to level of materiality when calculated with substantial certainty); Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F.

522

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16:511

This information-centric 72 approach to the disclosure question was applied by the Second Circuit in Electronic Specialty Co. v.
InternationalControls Corp.7 3 In that case, defendant International
Controls, desiring to acquire Electronic Specialty, deliberated on
the most feasible methods to effectuate such an acquisition. 4 A
tender offer and a merger were among the possibilities.7 5 When
Electronic Specialty stock subsequently reached an all time high
and Electronic Speciality merged with another company, a tender
offer was no longer a feasible method of acquisition.7 6 Only
later, when the market reacted unfavorably to the Electronic Specialty merger and the company's stock subsequently declined in
value, was International Controls able to make a tender offer for
up to 500,000 shares of Electronic Specialty. 77 The tender offer
stated that International Controls would consider a merger between itself, or one of its subsidiaries, and Electronic Specialty
78
after the tender offer.
Electronic Specialty and its shareholders challenged the
tender offer as a violation of section 14(e) of the Securities ExSupp. 812, 819 (D. Del. 1974) (asset valuations must be disclosed where data and
information selected do not involve substantial subjective judgment).
Such a policy is consistent with a disclosure analysis that focuses on the nature
of the information. An analytical continuum may be imagined where unreliable and
reliable information comprise the respective polar extremes. In between these extremes are varying degrees of unreliability and reliability. The locus of a particular
piece of information on this continuum may well determine whether an omission or
misrepresentation is a disclosure violation. Moreover, as inputs into the informational structure change, so too may any locus move. See, e.g., Staffin v. Greenberg,
672 F.2d 1196, 1206-07 (3d Cir. 1982) (while tender offeror has no duty to disclose
preliminary merger discussions where plans are indefinite, duty to disclose does
exist where an agreement to merge has been reached); Denison Mines, 388 F. Supp.
at 820 (determination whether asset appraisal should be disclosed "one of degree"
requiring weighing value, reliability, and potential for misinterpretation of data).
72 This approach to the disclosure question-namely, where disclosure depends
on the reliability, objectivity, definiteness, and empirical support of particular information-will hereinafter be referred to as the information-centric methodology.
Courts have applied this methodology to the disclosure question most frequently in
the context of asset appraisals, future earnings projections, and other hypothetical
data. See cases cited supra note 68. The SEC and the courts have generally as a
matter of policy not required the inclusion of appraised asset valuations, projections, and other soft information in proxy materials and tender offers, primarily
because of the belief that soft information is unreliable. See id.
73 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
74 See id. at 941.
75 Id.
76 See id.
77 Id. at 942.

78 Id. at 942-43.
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change Act of 1934. 7 9 The plaintiffs claimed that International
Controls' failure to elaborate on the superficial reference to a
merger in the tender offer constituted a material omission under
section 14(e). 80 While noting that a tender offeror had to describe any merger plans pursuant to SEC rule 14d-l(c) and
schedule 13D, the Second Circuit nevertheless held that International Controls had violated no securities laws. 8 1 The court recognized that, although International Controls made only a brief
reference to a merger, "[i]t would [have been] as serious an infringement of [the disclosure] regulations to overstate the definiteness of the [merger] plans as to understate them."8' 2 Because
the court found that these merger plans were indefinite, they did
not have to be disclosed."
The nature of the information also determined whether a
84
disclosure violation existed in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.
Within a period of approximately one year, Gamble-Skogmo
gained effective control of the General Outdoor Advertising
Company (General Outdoor).85 When it became apparent that
income from General Outdoor's advertising plants had declined,
Gamble-Skogmo agreed that some of the plants should be sold.8 6
This plan culminated in the sale of twenty-three of General Outdoor's thirty-six plants.87 Afterwards, Gamble-Skogmo decided
to effectuate a merger with General Outdoor. 8 8 Both boards approved the transaction and Gamble-Skogmo's revised proxy
statement draft passed SEC review. 8 9 Gamble-Skogmo subsequently mailed the proxy statement to General Outdoor's
stockholders. 90
The plaintiffs, minority stockholders of General Outdoor, alleged that the proxy statement was materially false and misleading in violation of rule 14a-9(a). 9 1 Specifically, the plaintiffs
contended that General Outdoor should have disclosed its ap79 See id. at 943-44.
80

See id. at 943.

81 Id. at 948-49.

Id. at 948.
See id. at 948-49.
478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
85 Id. at 1284.
86 See id. at 1284-85.
87 Id. at 1285.
88 Id. at 1286.
89 Id. at 1286-87.
90 Id. at 1287.
91 Id. at 1289.
82
83
84
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praisal of the market value of the remaining unsold plants, and
that Gamble-Skogmo should have disclosed its intention to sell
these plants after the completion of the merger.92 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held
that General Outdoor violated rule 14a-9(a) by failing to disclose
adequately the market value of the advertising plants still unsold
at the time of the merger.93 The court based its conclusion
largely on the SEC's amicus curiae brief, which stated that
"although appraisals generally cannot be disclosed because they
may be misleading, existing appraisals of current liquidating
value must be disclosed if they have been made by a qualified
94
expert and have a sufficient basis in fact."
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, finding that two factors militated against imposing liability on Gamble-Skogmo. 95
First, the court observed that a note appended to rule 14a-9 declared that future market values, dividends, or earnings predictions were information that could be misleading. 96 Second, the
court reasoned that however desirable the SEC's change in attitude toward existing appraisals of current liquidating value was,
liability could not be imposed on Gamble-Skogmo based on this
change. 97 According to the court, the SEC's current position was
clearly contrary to the law as it existed ten years earlier when the
defendants drafted the allegedly inadequate proxy statement.98
The Second Circuit held, however, that Gamble-Skogmo's
intention to sell at a substantial profit the plants remaining unsold after the merger should have been disclosed. 99 The court
reached this conclusion by accepting the district court's factual
finding that Gamble-Skogmo intended to sell all the remaining
plants "immediately after the merger."100 Thus, the court found
that the omission of such definite information from the proxy
statement might have misled General Outdoor's shareholders
into believing that Gamble-Skogmo would "remain in the outdoor advertising business" after the merger.' 0 '
Id.
See
94 Id.
95 See

at 1295.
id. at 1303.
at 1292.
id. at 1292-95.
96 Id. at 1292.
97 See id. at 1293; see also infra notes 121-130 (explaining SEC's attitudinal shift).
98 Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1293.
99 Id. at 1295.
100 Id. (citation omitted). Gamble-Skogmo did not argue that these findings were
erroneous. See id. at 1296.
101 Id.
92

93

1986]

NOTES

525

The Gerstle court thus relied heavily on the information-centric methodology 0 2 to resolve the disclosure questions before it.
Because courts had traditionally regarded asset appraisals as inherently unreliable information that did not have to be disclosed,
the Gerstle court rejected the plaintiffs' contention concerning disclosure of the appraised value of the unsold plants. 0 3 On the
other hand, the court agreed with the plaintiffs' position that
Gamble-Skogmo should have disclosed its definite intention to
sell the remaining plants after the merger because this information was reliable.'0 4 Having characterized this particular information as reliable, the court then considered whether its omission
from the proxy statement was material. 0 5 The court ultimately
determined that the omission was material because it had "a significant propensity to affect the [shareholders'] voting process." 106
Therefore, before reaching the final question of materiality, the
Gerstle court initially focused its inquiry on the nature of the
See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
104 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
105 Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1302-03.
106 Id. at 1302 (quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 325, 384 (1970)).
"At the time of the merger,. . . [General Outdoor's] minority shareholders [had to
choose] between retaining their shares in [General Outdoor] . . .or exchanging
them for a small premium for the [Gamble-Skogmo] convertible preferred [stock]."
Id. General Outdoor's earnings prospects were poor if it continued with outdoor
advertising. Id. It looked forward to extraordinary profits from its potential liquidation, however. Id. As for the Gamble-Skogmo convertible preferred stock, it was
"a security involving much less risk but with a correspondingly reduced interest in
the profits potentially available through sales of advertising plants." Id. Thus, the
omission from the proxy statement of Gamble-Skogmo's plans to sell the remaining
unsold plants after the merger from the proxy statement was material. Id.
The Second Circuit's determination that Gamble-Skogmo's intention to sell
the remaining plants was material to the reasonable shareholder does not change
the fact that the appraisals of the remaining unsold plants were soft information
and therefore should not have been disclosed. Neither does it change the fact that
the court did not apply the reasonable shareholder standard of materiality to evaluate Gamble-Skogmo's failure to disclose this intention until the court was convinced that the information at issue was a "fact." In other words, were GambleSkogmo's intentions to sell the remaining plants after the merger uncertain and
speculative, then it would have been unnecessary for the Second Circuit to proceed
to a discussion of materiality from the standpoint of the reasonable shareholder.
Those intentions-like the asset appraisals-would at that point have been soft information. As it was, the district court found that the sale plans were sufficiently
based in fact. See id. at 1295-96. Given this objective quality, the Second Circuit
held that Gamble-Skogmo's failure to disclose its intent rendered the proxy statement "inadequate." Id. Only at that point did the court focus on whether the inadequacy in the proxy statement was material from the standpoint of the hypothetical
reasonable shareholder. See id. at 1301.
102

103
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information. 10 7
As recently as 1983, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio also focused its inquiry on the nature
of the information in a case brought under section 14(e)., 0 8 In
Resource Exploration v. Yankee Oil & Gas, Inc. ,10 Resource Exploration rejected several attempts by Yankee Oil to purchase all of its
outstanding shares on the basis that the bids did not represent
the true value of its common stock." ° Resource Exploration
based the valuation of its stock on an oil reserve report."' Prepared for the purpose of obtaining bank loans, the report con12
tained valuations of Resource Exploration's oil reserves."
Yankee Oil requested a copy of the report so that it could determine Resource's basis for rejecting its offer." 3 Subsequently,
Yankee Oil made a tender offer for Resource Exploration's outstanding common shares." 4
Resource Exploration sought to enjoin the proposed tender
offer, claiming that it violated section 14(e) of the Williams Act
because Yankee Oil failed to disclose the information contained
in the oil reserve report." 5 Resource Exploration argued that
this omission resulted in the undervaluation of its oil reserves
and hence an inadequate tender offer price per share." 6 The district court held that Yankee Oil did not omit any material information in violation of section 14(e)." 7 According to the court,
the reserve report contained "speculative information. . based
on arbitrary and shifting economic assumptions,"' 18 thereby
making the report a potentially misleading source of information." 9 Therefore, the court concluded that the purpose of the
Williams Act would not be served by requiring disclosure of the
20
reserve report. 1
Recent developments in the law of disclosure indicate a
107

See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.

108 See Resource Exploration v. Yankee Oil & Gas, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 54 (N.D.

Ohio 1983).
109 566 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
110 Id. at 57-58.
1 Id. at 58.
112

1'3
1'4
15
116

1'7
118

Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 61.
See id. at 62.
Id. at 63-65.
Id. at 63.

119 Id.
120 See

id. at 64.
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change in attitude toward what has traditionally been considered
soft information. 21 The SEC's amicus curiae brief in Gerstle heralded an apparent policy change with respect to the disclosure of
existing appraisals of current liquidating value.' 22 The Gerstle
court acknowledged that such a change was desirable.' 2 3 The
court declined to adopt the SEC's new policy, however, because
to do so would have required it to impose liability
for events that
124
occurred ten years before the policy change.
Nevertheless, the SEC has issued three releases in the past
several years, the combined effect of which has been to eliminate
the traditional anathema associated with soft information. In
1976, the SEC removed future earnings from the list of misleading disclosures noted under rule 14a-9.' 25 Two years later, the
Commission offered guidelines for disclosing forward-looking
statements and issued a safe harbor rule to encourage the disclosure of such information. 2 6 Finally, in 1980, the SEC authorized
disclosure of good faith appraisals made with reasonable bases in
proxy contests where the focus was the liquidation of all or a part
of the target company's assets. 127
The SEC releases, the SEC's Gerstle amicus curiae brief, and
the Gerstle court's approval of this brief indicated that certain
types of information traditionally considered soft would no
longer be automatically struck from SEC filings. 28 This apparent
attitudinal shift in favor of disclosing some soft information did
not, however, change the analytical framework applied by courts
in the past. When the information at issue concerned asset appraisals or future economic performance, for example, the SEC
now supported disclosure if the information contained sufficient
See supra note 67 (describing soft information).
See supra text accompanying notes 94-98.
Id.
124 Id.
125 SEC Release No. 5699, Notice of Adoption of an Amendment to Rule 14a-9,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,461 (1976).
126 SEC Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance,
Release No. 5992, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,756 (Nov.
7, 1978) [hereinafter cited as SEC Release No. 5992].
127 See SEC Interpretative Release Relating to Proxy Rules No. 34-16833, 3 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
24,117 (May 23, 1980).
128 That there was a blanket prohibition against soft information is evident from
the following excerpt from Gerstle: "The Commission's examiners 'are trained to
strike at appraisal values as unacceptable whenever they read them in documents
filed with the Commission.' It has long been an article of faith among lawyers specializing in the securities field that appraisals of assets could not be included in a
proxy statement." Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1293 (citations omitted).
121

122
123
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indicia of reliability. 129 This policy represented a change in prior
law because there was no longer a blanket prohibition against the
disclosure of soft information. 130 The inquiry required under this
new position, however, continued to focus on the nature of the
information.
In 1983, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio abandoned the information-centric methodology
in Radol v. Thomas, 13 1 even though the case involved asset appraisals. In October, 1981, Mobil Corporation made a tender offer for 40 million shares of Marathon Oil Company at $85.00 per
share. 132 Marathon, determined to defeat the tender offer, engaged the services of First Boston Corporation to recommend
potential white knights. 133 During this time, Marathon's management prepared an internal report inventorying the corporation's
assets and estimating their value.' 34 First Boston also prepared a
similar asset report based, however, only upon public information. 13 The calculations in both reports were speculative; they
included projections on the economy fifty years ahead and on the
future prices of oil.'

36

United States Steel Corporation became

Marathon's white knight in November, 1981 by making a tender
offer for 30 million outstanding Marathon shares at $125.00 per
share. ' 37 The tender offer material did 38
not contain the Marathon
valuations.
asset
Boston
First
and the
Marathon shareholders brought a class action against Marathon and United States Steel, contending that the failure to dis129 The SEC, in its Gerstle amicus curiae brief, argued that "existing appraisals of
current liquidating value must be disclosed if they have been made by a qualified
expert and have a sufficient basis in fact." Gerstle, 478 F. Supp. at 1292. Similarly,
in its release approving the disclosure of projections of company economic performance, the SEC stated that the assumptions underlying a particular projection
might so materially add to understanding the projected results that failure to include such assumptions would render the projections misleading. SEC Release No.
5992, supra note 126. For example, the SEC noted that "where projected results
are based to a significant degree upon the introduction of a new product or service
meeting certain anticipated levels of sales and contribution to earnings, disclosure
of the projection without this information might be misleading." Id. at 81,038.
130 See supra note 128.
131 556 F. Supp. 586 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
132 Id. at 587.
133 Id. "The term 'white knight' refers to an alternative merger partner toward
whom a corporation's management is friendly." Id. at 587 n.2.
134 Id. at 587.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 587-88.
137 Id. at 588.
138 See id.
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close the First Boston and internal asset valuations in the tender
offer violated section 14(e). 1 9 The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the valuations were immaterial because they were "based on imprecise calculations and
predictions."140 Unconvinced that asset valuations were immaterial "as a matter of law," the district court denied the defendants'
motion. 4 1 Instead, the court observed that a reasonable shareand that
holder might attach significance to the asset valuations
142
jury.
the
for
question
a
was
disclosure
of
the issue
Radol thus departed from the traditional approach to disclosure cases involving soft information; although the information
at issue involved asset appraisals, the court applied the reasonable shareholder standard of materiality instead of the information-centric methodology.' 43 Other courts resisted the Radol
approach to the disclosure question when the case involved soft
information in order to prevent the reasonable shareholder from
attaching significance to what was potentially misleading information. 14 Thus, when the lower court in Flynn directed a verdict
for the defendant, Bass Brothers, it did so because it found that
the asset valuations in the Prochemco reports contained insufficient factual information. 4 5 Contrary to Radol, the district court
held that the asset valuations were immaterial as a matter of

law. 146
On appeal, however, the panel for the Third Circuit declined
to recognize any per se invalidity of asset appraisals and other
soft information. 14 7 On the contrary, the court held that such
soft information must be disclosed in appropriate cases.148 To
determine the "appropriate cases" for disclosure of asset appraisals and other soft information, the Third Circuit declared
that courts must weigh "the potential aid such information will
give a shareholder against the potential harm, such as undue reliSee id. at 589.
Id. at 593.
141 Id. at 594.
142 Id.
143 See id.
144 See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
145 Flynn, 744 F.2d at 983.
146 Id. at 983. The district judge concluded that " 'the information that was provided by the tender offeror was not materially misleading in any way' particularly
because 'the information that was contained in the Prochemco report is the kind
that is not permitted to be disclosed to shareholders because it is not based on
sufficient information.' " Id. (citations omitted).
139
140

147 See id. at 988.
148

Id.
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ance."' 14 9 According to the Flynn court, the salient factors to consider in this balancing process are the following:
the facts upon which the information is based[,] the qualifications of those who prepared or compiled it[,] the purpose for
which the information was originally intended[,] its relevance
to the stockholders' impending decision[,] the degree of subjectivity or bias reflected in its preparation[,] the degree to
which the information is unique[,] and the availability to
the
50
investor of other more reliable sources of information. 1
The court opined that an additional factor to consider is whether a
cautionary note was attached to the soft information, warning the
shareholders of its potential unreliability.' 5 '
The court noted that its new disclosure test recognized and encompassed the evolution of disclosure law. 152 The court then traced
this evolution beginning with a discussion of the legislative history
of the Williams Act, noting that the purpose of the Act was the protection of investors faced with tender offers.' 5 3 The Third Circuit
observed that section 14(e) of the Act "prohibit[ed] the making of
untrue statements of material fact or the omission of material facts
in tender offers that could mislead the shareholders of a target company." ' 54 The court then adopted the TSC Industries standard: a
" 'fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote.' - 55

The court recognized that the long-standing aversion to the disclosure of soft information resulted from its unreliability and its
propensity to mislead target shareholders.' 5 6 The Third Circuit also
noted that it had previously adhered to this traditional view.' 5 7 The
court stated, however, that the presence of "several indicia of reliability" sometimes weighed in favor of disclosing appraised asset valuations. 58 The court identified prevalent indicia of reliability
considered by courts in the past as consisting of "the qualifications
of those who prepared or compiled the appraisal[,] the degree of
Id.
150 Id. (citation omitted).
151 See id. & n.17.
152 Id. at 988. Indeed, the opinion included a detailed account of the development of the law of disclosure in tender offers. See supra notes 153-159.
153 Flynn, 744 F.2d at 983.
154 Id. at 984 (footnote omitted).
155 Id. at 985 (quoting TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 449).
156 See id.
157 Id. at 985-86 (footnotes omitted).
158 Id. at 986.
149
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certainty of the data on which it was based[,] the purpose for which
it was prepared[,] and evidence of reliance on the appraisal."' 5 9
The court concluded that at the time of Bass Brothers' tender
offer in 1976, courts discouraged, but did not prohibit, the disclosure of soft information.' 60 It noted, moreover, that recent attitudinal changes in the SEC's position, as evidenced by the three releases
issued between 1976 and 1980,161 indicated that the law had begun
to favor disclosure of soft information. 6 2 According to the court,
the reason for this attitudinal shift was the potential import of this
information to target shareholders. 6 3 The court reasoned that the
"unintended by-product" of protecting shareholders from potentially unreliable information was that these same shareholders were
sometimes denied valuable information."
The Flynn court observed that a more favorable judicial disposition toward asset appraisals and other soft information was desirable.165 The court noted, however, that such a development had been
stalled in the past by a conservative and incremental common law
posture. 166 By way of example, the court referred to Gerstle, wherein
the Second Circuit declined to impose liability retroactively for a
1963 proxy statement violative of the law of disclosure in 1 9 7 3 .167
Nevertheless, "[i]n order to give full effect to the evolution in the
law of disclosure, and to avoid.

. .

the problem caused by the time

lag between challenged acts and judicial resolution," the Flynn court
established a balancing test and purported to "set forth the law for
disclosure of soft information as it is to be applied from [now]
on."16

Despite this new development in the law of disclosure, the court
declined to apply it retroactively. 6 9 Rather, to determine whether
Id. (footnotes omitted).
See id. at 985-86.
See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
Flynn, 744 F.2d at 986-87.
Id. at 987.
164 Id.
165 See id. at 988.
166 See id. at 985-86.
167 Id. at 987-88. For a discussion of Gerstle's refusal to give retroactive effect to
the SEC's attitudinal change, see supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
168 Flynn, 744 F.2d at 988. For a discussion of the Flynn balancing test, see supra
notes 149-151 and accompanying text.
169 Flynn, 744 F.2d at 988 (footnote omitted). The court was reluctant to apply
the "new standard for disclosure" established in this decision. See id. The reason
for the prospective application of this new standard parallels the Second Circuit's
refusal in Gerstle to apply the changes in the law of disclosure in the disposition of
that case; 10 years had elapsed between the allegedly inadequate proxy statement
159

160
161
162
163
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the Prochemco reports and the internal valuations should have been
disclosed, the court applied the disclosure standard prevalent in
1976.170 This involved a determination of whether the information
"had sufficient indicia of reliability to require disclosure."' 17 ' The
court determined that the Prochemco reports failed to meet this test
because the Prochemco officials who prepared them were nonexperts in land appraisals, the subject of the reports. 7 2 The court further noted that Prochemco originally prepared the reports in order
to procure financing for its contemplated purchase of a controlling
block of National Alfalfa stock.'77 Given these factors militating
against reliability, the court held that "at the time of the tender offer
7 4
Bass Brothers had no duty to disclose the Prochemco reports.'
Regarding the internal valuation report of National Alfalfa's
stock, the court noted that it relied on several assumptions, such as
appreciated land value projections. 7 5 Therefore, the court found
that this report had no indicia of reliability because there was an
insufficient factual basis for the valuations. 176 The court observed
that National Alfalfa's vice president testified that the land values in
the report were inflated to facilitate the sale of the controlling block
of shares. 1 77 Moreover, the vice president admitted that no one involved in the land appraisals had any expertise. 17 The court concluded that the report was unreliable and should not have been
disclosed 179 and thus affirmed the district
court's ruling of a di180
rected verdict in favor of the defendants.
The Third Circuit's opinion in Flynn is replete with references
and the Gerstle court's decision. See Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1294. In Flynn, the Third
Circuit stated: "We note that despite our formulation of the current law applicable
to corporate disclosure, we are constrained by the significant development in disclosure law since 1976 not to apply the announced standard retroactively, but to
evaluate defendants' conduct by the standards which prevailed in 1976." Flynn, 744
F.2d at 988 (footnote omitted). At the same time, however, the court confined its
decision not to apply the new disclosure standard retroactively to the facts of the
Flynn case. Id. at 988 n.19. Thus, the court did "not intend to imply that in other
cases based on actions occurring before the date of this opinion, the new standard
necessarily is inapplicable." Id.
170 Flynn, 744 F.2d at 988-89.
171 Id. at 988.
172 Id. at 988-89.
173 Id. at 989.
174 Id.

Id.
Id. at 990.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 991.
175
176
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to the new standard for the disclosure of soft information.' 8 ' The
court did indeed formulate a new standard by striking a salutary balance between cases like Gerstle, which followed the information-centric methodology, and cases like Radol, which espoused the
reasonable shareholder standard. In Gerstie, soft information did not
have to be disclosed, even though a shareholder might have attached actual significance to such information. 182 In Radol, on the
other hand, shareholders' perceptions of materiality determined
whether particular information should have been disclosed, despite
the possibility that it might actually have been misleading and
unreliable. 8' 3
Between the standard utilized in cases like Gerstle and the standard utilized in cases like Radol lies the ideal-a disclosure system
where the nature of particular information and the perception of the
reasonable shareholder together decide the disclosure question,
with neither dominating the process. 18 4 Under such a disclosure
181 See id. at 988.
182 See supra notes 95-106 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 139-143 and accompanying text.
184 This reference to the "ideal" disclosure system is not intended to suggest that
any other disclosure standard that exists, or that a court may develop in the future,
is less than ideal and therefore inadequate. Rather, the term "ideal" should be
understood in its particular context: namely, as descriptive of the synthesis of the
predominant approaches to the disclosure question. As between the TSC Industries
definition of materiality and the information-centric methodology, such a synthesis
is indeed ideal in that it maintains the salient features of these two analyses while at
the same time eliminating their deficiencies. Thus, information that a reasonable
shareholder would consider significant in determining the proper disposition of his
shares is material and should be disclosed unless it is so unreliable and potentially
misleading as to best remain undisclosed. This ideal is implicit in the following
excerpt written by Carl Schneider:
Soft information may be highly relevant to investment decisions. It
is widely used in the financial community. Although the policy reasons
for barring it from filings have been, and still are, valid considerations,
there are strong countervailing considerations which must be balanced,
particularly the objective of giving investors the maximum amount of
useful information. The prevailing practice has resulted in filings which
convey an artificial or distorted view of economic realities and withhold
a great deal of useful and available information from investors.
The time has come for a reappraisal. Within controlled limits, and
on an experimental basis, we should evolve new standards that would
permit, and in some instances require, broader use of soft information
in filings if it is relevant, material, reasonably reliable, and adequately
qualified. There may be a risk that some investors will misuse soft information or be misled by it. There may be increased risk of liability
against companies and their managements who will face difficult
problems in dealing with soft information. But these risks are acceptable ones, in view of the corresponding benefits to be realized by giving
more useful information to investors.

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16:511

analysis, information that is important to the reasonable shareholder must be disclosed unless the nature of such information renders its disclosure more detrimental than beneficial to the
shareholder faced with a tender offer.' 8 5 Such an analysis is the most
desirable synthesis of the information-centric methodology and the
reasonable shareholder standard of materiality.
The Flynn decision eliminated all obstacles to a prospective application of this ideal disclosure standard. First, the Flynn court explicitly adopted the reasonable shareholder standard of materiality
established in TSC Industries.'8 6 The court then stated that courts
must balance the possible assistance soft information will give shareholders against the potential harm.' 8 7 Although the court did not
articulate how these two components are to be applied, it is reasonable to conclude that courts should utilize both to resolve disclosure
questions. Otherwise, the Flynn court's approval of the TSC Industries definition of materiality was purposeless.
The reason for the Flynn court's acceptance of the TSC Industries
standard is evident in footnote twenty-two of its opinion where the
court stated: "Were this case tried under the standard for disclosure we announce today, the case might well have been for the
jury.""8 This footnote does not mean that the disclosure of soft information is a question for the jury alone; Flynn also directs courts
to weigh the potential aid soft information will give a shareholder
against the potential harm.' 8 9 Neither does this footnote mean that
the case would be one for the jury because the information was unquestionably reliable, thereby obviating the need to invoke the balancing test to protect shareholders from harmfully unreliable
information. Otherwise, soft information would remain an anathema in tender offer disclosures because the reasonable shareholder's perception of the materiality of particular information
would be invoked only when the information was not soft. Neither,
for that matter, does footnote twenty-two mean that a case goes to
the jury on the issue of materiality after the court determines that
the nature of the information does not weigh against disclosure.
Although it proceeds on the premise that a synthesis of the TSC InSchneider, supra note 67, at 304-05.
185 See, e.g., South Coast Servs. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d
1265, 1274-78 (9th Cir. 1982) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (applying the ideal disclosure system).
186 Flynn, 744 F.2d at 985.
187

Id. at 988.

188
189

Id. at 991 n.22.

See id. at 988.
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dustries standard of materiality and the information-centric methodology is desirable, 90 such an interpretation is merely a restatement
of the analysis developed in Gerstle. If this were the case, the Flynn
court could not very well claim to set forth a new standard for the
disclosure of soft information.
There is only one disclosure standard that is both "new" and
premised on the salutary synthesis of the information-centric methodology and the reasonable shareholder standard of materiality. 91'
This standard examines the reasonable shareholder's perception of
materiality directly before inquiring as to whether the potential benefits from disclosure outweigh the potential disadvantages. 19 2 Such
190 See supra notes 184-185 and accompanying text.
191 The Flynn court created the need for determining whether such a standard
exists. First, it explicitly stated: "[T]oday we set forth the law for disclosure of soft
information as it is to be applied from this date on." Flynn, 744 F.2d at 988. Second, by declining to apply the "new standard" retroactively, the court never had to
explicitly consider how the components of its opinion-the TSC Industries reasonable shareholder standard and the information-centric methodology-fit into a
comprehensive and unitary disclosure standard. In the absence of such a determination, courts and practitioners may well be at a loss as to how to vindicate the
Third Circuit's intentions "to give full effect to the evolution in the law of disclosure, and to . . .set forth the law for disclosure of soft information as it is to be
applied from this date on." Id.
192 At least one Federal judge has recognized such an analysis. See Southcoast
Servs. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265, 1274 (9th Cir.
1982) (Fletcher, J., dissenting). In Southcoast, the Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Company's (SAVI) board of directors received several offers to sell the company's assets
for cash. Id. at 1268. As a result of these offers, SAVI had two asset valuation reports prepared. Id. at 1267-68. An expert appraiser prepared one of the two reports on the value of two of SAVI's properties. Id. at 1268. The SAVI board
internally prepared the second report for the remainder of the company's property.
See id. In the ensuing proxy statement issued to elicit shareholder approval of a sale
of SAVI's assets, the board revealed only the expert's valuations. Id. at 1269. The
SAVI shareholders challenged the adequacy of the information in the proxy statement. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that SAVI had no duty to disclose its own internal
valuations, as they contained no indicia of reliability. Id. at 1272-73. Specifically,
the court noted that the SAVI directors were not expert appraisers. Id. at 1272.
According to the Ninth Circuit, the directors "employed no uniform method of
valuation in making their estimates." Id. The board did not establish any "guidelines or standards . . .for the selection of relevant data" and for weighing and
evaluating such data. Id. They did not agree on the assumptions underlying the
appraisals; each director relied on his personal knowledge and experience to arrive
at individual "high, middle and low figures for each property." Id. The board
members did not communicate their assumptions to one another. See id. Moreover, "the board never formally approved the estimates, and some board members
did not know what figures had been selected until they saw the accountants' report." Id.
Dissenting Judge Fletcher, however, believed that the SAVI board's internal
valuations should have been disclosed in the proxy statement. Id. at 1277
(Fletcher, J., dissenting). Judge Fletcher stated that "[li]aboring under the constraining assumption that appraisal information must in most instances be excluded
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an interpretation is consistent with footnote twenty-two; if there is
no substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider soft information important in deciding how to vote, then the
information is immaterial. Its omission is not a violation of the disclosure requirements, and there is no need for a court to determine
whether the benefits from disclosure outweigh the disadvantages. In
such a case, the question of disclosure begins and ends with the
jury, which dons the persona of reasonable shareholders. Where
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider soft information important in deciding how to vote, then
the court must determine whether the disclosure of such informa19 3
tion would unduly harm the shareholders.
The Flynn court did not explicitly set forth this synthesis of the
information-centric methodology and the reasonable shareholder
standard of materiality. It did not have to; the court decided the
case based on the standard for disclosure prevailing at the time Bass
Brothers made the tender offer. 194 Nevertheless, this lack of specificity on the part of the Flynn court does not compromise the significance of the opinion. The court recognized that the reasonable
shareholder standard of TSC Industries and the long-standing refusal
to compel the disclosure of soft information were legitimate methods of resolving the disclosure question. 195 At the same time, however, the court noted that both approaches to the disclosure
96
question spun off unfortunate consequences for shareholders.
Under the reasonable shareholder standard, it was feared that potential stock buyers would be misled by management's overly optimistic
projections
and by other
characteristically
soft
information.19 7 Conversely, the prohibition of soft information from
tender offer disclosures sometimes kept valuable information from
98
target shareholders.'
If the court were inclined to decide the Flynn case based on the
in deference to a blanket SEC prohibition against its disclosure," id. at 1276
(Fletcher, J., dissenting), the majority "failed to take the necessary first step of determining materiality." Id. at 1274 (Fletcher,J., dissenting). Specifically, this "necessary first step" involved applying the TSC Industries standard to determine
whether the omission of the internal asset valuations constituted a material omission under rule 14a-9. Id. Only if the information were in fact material under the
TSC Industries definition should the court, in Judge Fletcher's view, have proceeded
to determine the value of disclosing it in light of the nature of such information. Id.
193 See Flynn, 744 F.2d at 988.
194 See id.
195 See id. at 985-87.
196 See id. at 987.
197 Id.
198 Id.
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"new" disclosure standard, it would have inevitably reached the synthesis developed in this analysis. As the foregoing discussion suggests, any other approach to the disclosure question fails to
eliminate the deleterious consequences occasioned by focusing
solely on the reasonable shareholder's perception or on the nature
of the information. The Flynn court clearly disapproved the perpetuation of these consequences. 99 The proper analysis should focus
initially on the possible significance a reasonable shareholder would
attach to soft information. If a reasonable shareholder would find
the information significant, then the analysis should weigh the benefits against the harms that such information will bring to target
shareholders. This approach alone ensures against exposure to
overly misleading and unreliable information and, concomitantly,
against a blanket omission of otherwise valuable soft information.
As a result of Flynn, tender offerors may have to disclose soft
information in the future."' ° When there is a substantial likelihood
199 See id.

Before Congress passed the Williams Act in 1968, Professor Victor Brudney
criticized the bill's disclosure requirements. See Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender
Solicitations, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 609 (1967). He believed that "the proposed requirement for disclosure of future plans [by the tender offeror would] create a
happy hunting ground for plaintiffs." Id. at 624. Flynn's imposition of a duty to
disclose soft information may well resurrect this criticism.
To be sure, the specter of liability is not a criticism without teeth. According to
one commentator:
A principal objection to soft disclosures in SEC filings is the inherent risk of liability if soft information is challenged, an objection which
should not be underestimated. The potential liability for an inadequate
disclosure document can be enormous. As a matter of proof, it may be
much more difficult to determine the adequacy of a soft disclosure, as
contrasted with a hard one.
Schneider, supra note 67, at 302; see also Bauman, Rule lOb-5 and the Corporation's
Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO. L.J. 935, 973 (1979) (recognizing that corporations resisted disclosing internal projections because of fear of potential liability if
actual results varied materially from projections). The Flynn court's only inroad on
the liability factor is to sanction the use of a disclaimer by the tender offeror found
to have a duty to disclose certain soft information. See Flynn, 744 F.2d at 988. Such
a disclaimer may insulate tender offerors from liability. At the same time, however,
it threatens the efficacy of Flynn and the legitimacy of the duty to disclose in general.
A blanket insulation from liability may lead to careless and mechanical disclosures of what is actually harmful information. Presumably, the balancing test established in Flynn separates beneficial from misleading soft information. See id. If this
balancing test works without any error factor, then there is no danger that target
shareholders will be exposed to careless and mechanical disclosures. Should every
offeror adopt a careless and mechanistic approach, however, then the balance
would always weigh against disclosure. At that point, the demise of the duty to
disclose soft information would only be a matter of time. On the other hand, recognizing the existence of an error factor in the balancing test means that a portion
200
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that a reasonable shareholder would consider particular soft information material and when a court determines that the benefits to
shareholders of disclosure outweigh the disadvantages, then the
corporate, legal, and investing communities will behold for the first
time an auspicious and overdue judicial hybrid. Born of the reconciliation and intercourse between the desire of shareholders for information and the reluctance of courts to order disclosure of
imprecise or misleading data, such a creature was unheard of at the
time Bass Brothers made its tender offer. From now on, however,
tender offerors might do well to accomodate this new animal-that
is, material soft information.
JudeJ. Tonzola
of the potentially careless and mechanical disclosures may end up in the target
shareholders' informational mix.
Of course, this portentous scenario assumes that-under the sanction of a disclaimer-some tender offerors will act in bad faith. Therefore, the efficacy of the
Flynn ruling depends on tender offerors undertaking the duty to disclose soft information in good faith. Moreover, tender offeror compliance with such a standard
may well depend on the extent to which a good faith disclosure eliminates the apprehension of liability traditionally associated with the disclosure of soft information. According to Bauman, "the standard for measuring whether a corporation
has breached its duty must focus on the corporation's good faith efforts to satisfy its
disclosure obligations, even if those efforts do not always meet with success. The
corporation that has made such an effort should be protected from liability."
Bauman, supra, at 989; see also Kripke, supra note 71, at 1075 ("The standard should
• . . be whether, after reasonableinvestigation under the circumstances, the persons accused of
misrepresentation reasonably believed that the presentation which they made was a fair one. ');
Schneider, supra note 67, at 304 ("[A] person making a soft disclosure in good faith
and with reasonable prudence should be protected against liability, even if his opinion or prediction turns out to be incorrect.").

